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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 10-3122 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
v.  
 
MICHAEL PENWELL, 
Appellant 
_______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 08-cr-00387-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Doneta W. Ambrose  
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 5, 2011 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: December 27, 2011) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
McKee, Chief Judge 
Defendant Michael Penwell appealed from the district court’s 360 month 
judgment of sentence.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
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I. 
As we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of this case, we will set forth only those facts relevant to our conclusion.  
Penwell’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that after a conscientious examination of the record, Penwell’s 
appeal is wholly frivolous.  Id. at 744.  When reviewing an Anders brief, this court’s 
inquiry is two fold: (1) whether counsel has thoroughly and conscientiously examined the 
record for appealable issues and explained why those issues are frivolous; (2) whether an 
independent review of the record would uncover any non-frivolous issues for appeal.  
United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  The brief must identify any 
“issue arguably supporting the appeal even though the appeal was wholly frivolous,” 
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000), “explain why the issues are frivolous,” 
United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2000), and show that counsel 
“thoroughly scoured the record in search of appealable issues.” Id. at 780, see also Youla, 
241 F.3d at 300.  “Counsel need not raise and reject every possible claim[,]” but he or she 
must still conscientiously examine the record. Youla, 241 F.3d at 300.   
II. 
Counsel has identified two potential non-frivolous issues and explained why each 
is frivolous: (1) whether the Rule 11 colloquy was thorough and in full compliance with 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; and (2) whether the district court imposed a reasonable sentence.   
Counsel adequately explains the frivolousness of an appeal regarding the Rule 11 
colloquy.  The guilty plea clearly met the standards for a knowing and voluntary plea 
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established in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and the requirements provided in 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  See United States v. Schweitzer, 454 
F.3d 197, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2006).  During the sentencing hearing, Penwell was addressed 
personally by the district court prior to the court accepting his plea.  The court informed 
him of his constitutional right to a jury trial, his right to be represented by counsel, his 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and that these rights would be waived if he 
pled guilty.  Additionally, the court explained the maximum possible penalty he could 
receive and reviewed the sentencing process.  The court then administered a thorough 
plea colloquy, asking Penwell questions regarding his competency and understanding of 
the proceeding. When asked if he understood, Penwell responded in the affirmative.  The 
plea colloquy easily satisfied the constitutional and statutory requirements.  Penwell 
knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to all three charges. 
The sentence imposed was procedurally and substantively reasonable.  The court 
reviews de novo procedural errors in interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines, Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 39 (2007), and considers a sentence’s substantive 
reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009).  The substantive reasonableness of a sentence depends upon 
“whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 
(3d Cir. 2007).   
Here, the court did not procedurally err when interpreting the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  The 360 month sentence was the exact sentence advised by U.S.S.G. § 
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5G1.1(a) and therefore within the Guidelines.  The court rationally and carefully 
considered the § 3553(a) factors and articulated its reasons for imposing the sentence.  
Accordingly, any appeal challenging the reasonableness of the sentence is wholly 
frivolous.   
III. 
Defendant, in his pro se brief, argues: (1) the district court incorrectly applied a 
five-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), because Penwell did not  
distribute child pornography for anything of value or the expectation of anything of 
value; and (2) the court did not have jurisdiction.  We conclude that both arguments are 
frivolous.   
The argument relating to the enhancement is a question of fact and is reviewed for 
clear error.  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008). Section 
2G2.2(b)(3)(B) applies only to individuals who distribute child pornography because they 
expect to receive child pornography in return or have received it in return.  United States 
v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348, 351-52 (6th Cir. 2010).  Here, the sentencing hearing 
transcript reflects that Penwell used a picture sharing program to collect and trade child 
pornography, and thereby satisfied that requirement.   In a conversation with another 
trader he promised to send pictures of his daughter naked in exchange for “something 
hot.” The court’s finding that Penwell distributed child pornography for something of 
value, other images of child pornography, was sufficient to trigger the five-level 
sentencing enhancement.   
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Penwell’s second argument is also frivolous.  Penwell contends that § 3231 is 
unconstitutional because Public Law 80-772, was enacted in violation of Article I of the 
United States Constitution.  He claims both houses of Congress did not vote on it in the 
same legislative session.  We disagree. The validity of § 3231 has been affirmed by every 
court to address it.  Cardenas-Celestino v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d. 962, 966 
(W.D. Mo. 2008);  Mullican v. Stine, Civ. A. No. 07-129-KKC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
29884, 2007 WL 1193534 (ED. Ky. Apr. 23, 2007); Campbell v. Gonzalez, Civ. A. No. 
07-36-GFVT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23307, 2007 WL 1035021 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 
2007); Cullum v. Fox, Civ. A. No. 1:06cv309, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89551, 2006 WL 
3691170 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2006); Bledsoe v. Levi, Civ. A. No. 074543, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 84403, 2007 WL 3408449 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15,2007).  There is no merit to the 
claim Public Law 80-772 and § 3231 were not properly enacted by both houses of 
Congress.  See, e.g., United States v. Risquet, 426 F. Supp. 2d 310, 311 (E.D. Pa. 2006).  
The House voted on the bill, there was an inter-session adjournment, and then the Senate 
voted on it.  United States v. Martinez, CR No. C-04-157, C.A. No. C-05-423, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 31652, at *13-16 (S.D. Tex. May 6, 2006).  Bills passed by one house 
before an inter-session recess and by the other house after the recess are properly passed 
by Congress.  Derleth v. United States, CR. No. L-03-1745-6, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45540, at *11-12 (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2006).   Accordingly, because the district court had 
jurisdiction under § 3231 to try, convict and sentence Penwell, his appeal is wholly 
frivolous.   
IV. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the motion to withdraw and will affirm 
the district court’s judgment. 
